Bioleninism

There are a bunch of right wing theories that are necessary to understand certain aspects of how the world works. I have already written extensively on how national IQ influences economic success and vice versa. Theories that go into a more sociological or historical direction mostly come out of the neoreaction movement.

Today I want to give a brief overview and some comments on Bioleninism. Bioleninism was proposed by the blogger Spandrell a couple of years back and has quickly become mainstream in right wing circles for two reasons: It definitely captures some of what’s going on and it also allows right wingers to sneer a leftist activists.

To me bioleninism is a great theory because it neatly explains two great sociological mysteries.

The first mystery concerns the development of mainstream thought. In the West it seems to have one direction only. Political thought only ever moves to the left. Todays conservatives are just yesteryears lefties. This is a really strong pattern and a huge problem for conservatives. If they are historically aware they basically have to react to the extreme left ideas now, because those will be entrenched in just a couple of years. Which then predictably causes the reaction „conservatives are in a moral panic“. A few years later all conservative fears have come true.

This trend is called „Cthulhu always swims left“. I think this term originated in rationalist circles.

The second mystery is that this trend did not exist in the Soviet Union. Anatoly Darlin calls this the „Soviet freezer“. For some reason Eastern European countries came out of the Cold War with many social attitudes basically identical to what they used to be in the West before World War 2. They then generally started to drift leftwards but the remnants can still be seen in for example in Victor Orban’s laws against homosexual propaganda.

Spandrell explains that „Socialism“ (or really any leftwing endeavor) works by solving a coordination problem:

„With all the scientific advances of the last centuries, the 18th and 19th century intellectuals were just brimming with excitement with all the things they could get done. All those plans of social engineering. Utopia on earth! It just seemed so feasible. And yet they could never pull it off through the political process. They just couldn’t pull it off. The politicians and bureaucrats just weren’t loyal enough. Constant factionalism and infighting made any real reform impossible.“

„Socialism works by hacking the Social Calculus Module that humans have in our brains. Remember, humans care deeply about status. Status is what drives human behavior. Everybody works to achieve more status, and to avoid losing status. Socialism of course sells egalitarianism. It tells people with low status that they can get some more.“

„Socialism works not only because it promises higher status to a lot of people. Socialism is catnip because it promises status to people who, deep down, know they shouldn’t have it. There is such a thing as natural law, the natural state of any normally functioning human society. Basic biology tells us people are different. Some are more intelligent, more attractive, more crafty and popular. Everybody knows, deep in their lizard brains, how human mating works: women are attracted to the top dogs. Being generous, all human societies default to a Pareto distribution where 20% of people are high-status, and everyone else just has to put up with their inferiority for life. That’s just how it works.“

„What did Lenin do? Exterminate the natural aristocracy of Russia, and build a ruling class with a bunch of low-status people. Workers, peasants, Jews, Latvians, Ukrainians. Lenin went out of his way to recruit everyone who had a grudge against Imperial Russian society. And it worked, brilliantly.“

The key insight here is that there is nobody as loyal and motivated as a low status person whom you promised higher status. This means that especially in a democracy, low status groups are basically pools of untapped power. If you manage to mobilize them you’ll have tireless activists and loyal voters and therefore good chances to achieve your objective.

„But of course the Left has been in power for 200 years now. Once they got power, they got enjoyed their hardly fought high status. Naturally they lost discipline, until a party further Left appeared, and then won. And so on and so forth. Cthulhu always swims left. That’s where power is.“

This describes the dynamic in a western democracy, how about the East, where the leftist victory was much more decisive?

„The point about Leninism is that after absolute power is achieved, the leftist ratchet stops. The country stops moving left. No new ideas. No new catering to low-status people and using them to topple the government. No, none of that. The ever advancing leftist movement was just a means to an end. The end was power. Once power is achieved, leftism dissolves.“

If one group achieves absolute dictatorial power, it suppresses all movements from the left. Of course without being voters, these movements have a much harder time getting traction anyway. But in the West this dynamic seems to be a perpetuum mobile. Shouldn’t at some point all civil rights movements have run their course?

„But even in the best of worlds, there’s always low status people. Even if you re-engineer society so that there’s complete equality of opportunity, even if you run a revolution and you dissolve every existing hierarchy and start anew. There will always be low status people.

Because there’s always biology. Some people are tall, some people are short. Some look good, some are pretty ugly. Some are thin and some are fat. Some are pleasant some are annoying. Some are cool and some are awkward. Some are smart and some are dumb. Some make good choices some make bad choices. Some are law-abiding and some are criminally inclined. The latter of each pair is going to be low status anywhere on earth. Even in Soviet Communism under commander Trotsky. Some people just suck. That’s the way genes work.“

For biological reasons you will never run out of low status people. This means there is always a pool of power waiting to be tapped. Homosexuals, the morbidly obese, the transsexuals … You can mobilize women in one wave of feminism after another. Minorities likewise.

As mentioned in the introduction, this theory is a winner. Not only does it obviously explain a part of what is happing, maybe even a large part, but it also allows its adherent to sneer at leftist activists.

The part that makes the theory gloatable is, maybe not surprisingly, the least convincing. Not because it is wrong per se, but because it seems unnecessary. Consider:
If you are an up-and-coming fascist in the 20ies or 30ies of the 19th century, low status men will flock to your banner to grab the one chance to rise they will likely get. And maybe that’s great for you. You can make that point to them individually and recruit them one by one. But you can’t address them as a group. „Losers in this society are unfairly maligned, stand with me, dear losers, and I’ll fight for your rights“ just doesn’t work. So the key aspect of having a biologically defined group seems to be that biological characteristics define identities. And identities define groups that can be addressed wholesale. And that allows you to recruit entire groups to your cause.

There really is no necessity for the biological characteristic to also directly be the reason for the low status. It would be perfectly fine to have an identity group that is low status, say, because it is a minority with a different religion in a very religious country. Or an ethnic minority in a very racist country. For example, it would not be very surprising to see such groups overrepresented in a Bolshevik revolution. It also seems very unlikely that African Americans, for example, subconsciously feel deep down, that in a functioning society, they will always be low status.

And of course the whole „low status people flock to extremist groups“ isn’t a solely leftist phenomenon either. I noticed for example that catholic student unions at my alma mater seemed to exhibit a statistically very significant „pimple and braces“ density.

Conversely, there are low status groups, even low status for biological reasons, that are never subjects of the whole civil rights circus. Autists come to mind. Autists just aren’t very recruitable.

So if we see low status people flock to extreme ideologies, that’s just the same mechanism for the left and the right. It happens on an individual basis and is driven by these individuals’s choices. Sometimes the reason for the low status is biological, sometimes not. It doesn’t really matter.

On the other hand, if low status groups are picked as new „civil rights“ causes, then this is a way to mobilize the political power inherent in an recruitable low status group and it is driven by power hungry individuals that usually already are high status. Here the important characteristic of the group is not that the low status is biological, but that the group is recruitable. Biologically defined groups are often recruitable, because identity markers are often biological.

These are two separate mechanisms.

This blog – update

Life, uh, finds a way to inconveniently intervene with important tasks like blogging. Although I have quite a few articles lined up, they only have to be written! Some of these are so hardcore that I probably neither going to publish nor write them. In fact I consider deleting the blog before the point arrives where all text on the internet is de-anonymized by machine learning models that infer identical authorship for stuff written in forums, blogs, books, articles, papers, on twitter or even said in videos, podcasts and the like under different names and identities.

I have little doubt that this is in principle possible and at some point it might be done for those anonymous authors that trample too many holy cows. And it would mean that every text by me under my real name would risk triggering a comparison with the database of naughty authors. It might even become a service for HR – check whether the guy who just send you a resume might share a suspicious amount of favorite vocabulary, phrases, grammatical mistakes, topics, etc. with a political deviant.

Of course deletion comes too late, too – the internet archive has already archived the internet. So I count on my insignificance in both blogging and real life to keep going a little longer.

Covid still a thing, but I count on vaccinations being effective enough even for strains that evade immune response to a certain degree. So, even with such strains it seems likely that the fatality rate will drop to flu levels. Normality beckons.

Bragging rights: Covid deaths in Germany are now squarely in the range I gave as a realistic more than 14 months ago. 13 month ago I wrote that the lab escape theory (that I thought and still think is reasonably likely) is becoming mainstream, but for the US liberal mainstream media this moment has only now arrived. Earlier endorsing it would have meant aligning with Trump, so everybody mentioning it was vilified. Now, a Nicolas Wade article seems to have flipped the mainstream attitude.

HBD

HBD is the study of how different peoples differ due to genetic reasons. It stand for „human biodiversity“, a term coined by Steve Sailer more than twenty years ago. The HBD sphere is a part of the internet where these kind of topics are discussed in blogs, forums or videos.

It is sad to say it, but the golden age of HBD seems to be over. Partly this is due to the overall decline of the blogosphere and partly it may be the shifting political climate that both makes it risky to discuss politically incorrect topics and also makes it seem futile to try to break into mainstream discourse.

Partly, however, HBD might be the victim of its own success. The idea that different populations differ in IQ and that this explains the varying degree of economic success seems to me to have percolated through the thinking fraction of the population. This is simultaneously the most important and the best proven of all HBD conjectures. At some point it just didn’t make sense to keep piling on with more and more IQ data analyses.

If and when really powerful polygenic scores for other attributes become available other interesting topics might receive attention, but right now most HBD topics beyond IQ are both much more speculative and less relevant, though certainly still interesting.

Below I give a link list of some of the most interesting HBD writers that I could remember offhand.

La Griffe Du Lion wrote maybe the prototypical HBD blog. Reading his analyses had a big impact on me. Not only because of the controversial content, but also it was the first time that I realized that with simple mathematical tools and freely available data it was possible to investigate all kinds of questions successfully.

Greg Cochran’s blog is lazy, but occasionally brilliant. He was much more correct about Covid from early on than most others.

Anatoly Karlin’s effort posts are great. What he published on IQ was so close to my own conclusions and observations that it spurred me on to start this blog.

Emil Kirkegaard does the actual science and his output is pretty crazy. Somehow he doesn’t get tired of scraping together some data to do a third replication of some study.

Steve Sailer’s main occupation seems to be to make fun of the NYT. But very occasionally he also writes some brilliant HBD articles. But just like the overall HBD sphere he probably has the impression that he has already said it all.

Something would be amiss if I would not also mention JayMan, HBDChick and Peter Frost. I never much read JayMan and HBDChick and their blogs are dead. These three are much less quantitative, but nevertheless introduced some key concepts or interesting ideas.

The new guy on the blog and recently the only source of regular and very interesting HBD content has been Crimkadid. He presents his ideas on twitter, which is pretty limiting to say the least. And he is mostly speculating with very little hard data involved. But so much fun …

Cognitive profiles in chess

One of the topics I find extremely interesting is cognitive profiles. Mostly because of how it ties in with how human intelligence works. In my blog posts [1] and [2] I present the theory, that mathematical and spatial IQ depends on pattern recognition via brain size, while verbal IQ and top down conceptual thinking depends to a large degree on sequence handling via the creation of synapses .

This theory explains several phenomena quite nicely, but it still is only a simplified version of what is really going on. It owes a lot to evidence due to the peculiar cognitive profiles of Ashkenazi jews, very verbal, very conceptual, but not that attuned to spatial patterns. Interestingly, Ashkenazi jews are also extremely, almost absurdly, successful at chess with almost 50% of world champions having Ashkenazi ancestry.

Chess ability also has two components that roughly correspond to pattern recognition and sequence handling: Positional understanding and calculation.
Positional understanding is an intuitive feeling for how the pieces should be placed, which squares might become weak and where many moves down the lines hidden dangers might surface. Calculation is the act of simulating likely future sequences of moves in your head to find tactical strikes, mating sequences or just a way to keep the balance.

Both positional understanding as well as the ability to calculate precisely and deeply is a necessary prerequisite to being a strong chess player. If your positional understanding is weak, you will never get a position were your calculating ability will be useful, you will basically start on the back foot and get deeper into trouble until something gives. If you calculate badly, you will miss tactical strikes both for you and your opponent. You will lack the ability to finish your opponent off in a winning position or to hold on in a bad one. Your overall playing strength is probably more determined by your level of positional understanding, but really you need both abilities.

Players are usually classified into positional players or tactical players, which roughly reflects which ability dominates their chess style, though this is also partly influenced by character – more aggressive players often play more tactically, less risk-taking players focus on positional considerations. And it changes with age, likely as the character does, with young men playing more tactically and aggressive and calculating better, and old men playing more positionally and cautious and calculating worse.

Conceptual thinking also has an analog in chess – strategic thinking or planning. Strategy in chess means working out a longterm plan of action that still has to implemented by precise calculation. As such it is somewhat difficult to separate it from calculation, at least in practice.

These chess analogues allow us to test whether my conceptual framework for cognitive abilities still holds in a different modality from verbal, mathematical and spatial IQ. Specifically we can take a look at the many Ashkenazi top players and assess whether sequence handling and pattern recognition make sense as the two basic dimensions of human cognitive ability or whether verbal IQ and mathematical/spatial IQ are different concepts altogether.

Let’s take this list of World Champions: Steinitz, Lasker, Capablanca, Alekhine, Euwe, Botvinnik, Smyslov, Tal, Petrosian, Spassky, Fischer, Karpov, Kasparov, Kramnik, Anand and Carlsen.

Which of these are most famous for their positional acumen? Capablanca, Karpov, Carlsen, Kramnik, Smyslov come to mind.
Which are famous for their calculating skills? Tal, Anand, Kasparov, Alekhine are the most unambiguous. Lasker and Fischer also make sense.
Famous strategists? Steinitz, Lasker, Botvinnik,

Petrosian is a complicated case, because he was a very cautious, i.e. positional player. But it seems his greatest strength was actually calculation (at least according to contemporaries, like Fischer). Euwe I also can’t quite place, he is a bit of an outlier, beating an out of form Alekhine for a one year stint as world champion. Fischer was head and shoulders above his contemporaries, he was great at everything, but I would tend to put him with the calculators. Spassky was a great attacking player, so maybe a calculator, but he was also very well rounded.

Who of these players is famous for extensive opening preparation? Steinitz, Alekhine, Euwe, Botvinnik, Fischer, Kasparov, Kramnik, Anand.

Now, these are subjective choices, but for now they’ll have to do. Let’s compute some p-values of how fitting these characteristics are for our conception of the Ashkenazi cognitive profile being very strongly tilted towards sequence handling.

The most striking result is that of the players with an otherworldly positional sense, not a single one has Ashkenazi ancestry. Given that we have 7/16 Ashkenazi champions, the probability for that to occur by chance is (9/16)^5 = 0.056. Goddammit! We have missed the coveted 5% significance threshold.

(Edit: Skimming through my old posts I noticed that I miscalculated here: The probability of randomly choosing a non-Ashkenazi is only 9/16 for the first player. For the next it will be 8/15 and so on, this actually puts the probability at 0.029 comfortably below 0.05.)

Anyway, 4 out of my 6 calculators have Ashkenazi ancestry and all of my three strategists. Among the opening preparation specialists no clear pattern is visible, so once again we fail to find Ashkenazi grit in chess. Ashkenazi players likely don’t dominate the calculator category, because calculation is not a pure form of sequence handling. Instead it is mixed with a form of pattern recognition – the ability to see tactical motives.

Overall the chess analogy to verbal and math/spatial IQ seems to work beautifully, at least within this narrow window of one ethnic cognitive profile. However, my theory would also predict that NE-Asians are positionally strong, but my impression is that they are rather on the tactical side. So there is still a lot of room for further investigations.

[1]
https://halfassed.science.blog/2019/02/02/a-theory-of-iq-three-mysteries-of-iq-research/

[2]
https://halfassed.science.blog/2019/02/09/a-theory-of-iq-cognitive-profiles-and-cortical-structures/

What explains the South-North gradient in German IQ?

n many countries one can observe a North-South gradient of IQ and height. The likely explanation is that being big and smart is more beneficial or rather more necessary in colder climate, and many animals show this pattern. In Germany however, there is a distinctive IQ gradient from South to North, while for height it is the other way around. Because of the Alpes in the South and the Sea in the North, the South has a harsher climate, which would serve to explain the IQ gradient. But why does the height gradient not follow suite?

Probably, because selection for IQ is much more recent than selection for height. Height difference within Europe are thousands of years old, as mentioned in Roman texts. IQ differences are likely significantly more recent. Of course, thousand of years ago Southern Germany already had harsher climate, but population movement since then obscured the temperature-height correlation.

However, I think even the IQ gradient is unlikely to be causally connected to climate differences. The cold winter theory probably holds when looking at the entire world or at least continents and the corresponding long time scales. But I doubt that IQ differences that established themselves in the last 1000 years within Europe owe much to climate. Instead I have a different theory: I propose that iodine deficiency had a strong positive selection effect on IQ.

In the Alpine region iodine is scarce. Iodine deficiency can retard IQ by up to 15 points. This effect on the alpine population was so noticeable in the past that in France the term „cretin des Alpes“ was coined (idiot from the Alpes). This entails, that if in an agricultural community a person with an IQ below 70 has little chance of ever supporting a family, this fraction of the population in an iodine deficient region is 7 times larger than elsewhere. So any natural selection for IQ is multiplied by the environmental retardation. This theory also neatly explains the Swiss nobel prize density, which is the highest in the world.

Second year review

This second year of my blogging career I managed to pen 24 posts, which comes close to the fortnightly schedule I vaguely aimed for.

Five of these post alone were on the topic of Covid19. Somehow I managed to not say anything really stupid in any of them. In fact my very initial, March 9th, rough estimate of 75.000 to 300.000 deaths in Germany still looks quite good … unfortunately.

My post on the imminence of synthetic porn also came out just in time. Now there are generative models like DALL-E [1] and on reddit there was an amateur project that was quite advanced.

I actually managed to do some data analyses with “Ashkenazi grit in chess” and the post on demographic change in France and Germany. My “random thoughts” kind of articles have dropped that moniker and just become less data heavy explorations of different interesting topics.

I am still not sure about the future of the blog. At the moment it seems like other more technical interests are making inroads on my time. Not just my time to write and analyse, but also my time to think about topics and to come up with new ideas what to write about. So it seems likely that my publishing frequency will drop again. On the other hand, there is still a steady flow of new ideas to write about, so I hope the drop will not take me too much from one post per two or three weeks.

[1] https://openai.com/blog/dall-e/

Covid again – the UK mutation

So, there is a new strain, originating in the UK, which is „70% more contagious“. Don’t even ask what that’s supposed to mean. The salient fact is that cases in the UK are on course to double every ten days now, even under lockdown conditions.

Source: Very extensive lesswrong-post

Basically, in this figure we see how in October and November the percentage of the new strain amongst sequenced strains rose super-exponentially to reach 10% in mid November. Then the figure mercifully ends.

Source: Same

But here, in number-of-cases figure for a bunch of random countries we see that the exponential kept going up until it burst out of the chest cavity of the UK like an alien. Meaning, that while other strains, aka „normal Covid“, were nicely going down, this strain took over and started dominating the case numbers. Because it is still not even close to 90% of all cases, and because „normal Covid“ is likely still going down, the number of all Covid cases is still not rising with the speed with which „new Covid“ is spreading. In the last three days the number of cases went from 400 to 500 which corresponds roughly to doubling every ten days.

If „new Covid“ is doubling every 6 or 7 days under lockdown conditions … well, let’s calculate some example numbers. Let’s say 300 of the 500 cases per million in the UK on December, 23rd are of the new strain. Of course, Christmas and new lockdown rules will make everything worse or better, but if we just extrapolate, 10 doublings will take just 60-70 days and take the number of cases to 30% of the population.

As of now, in the UK a record number of patients is already being treated for Covid. So frankly, this looks very bad.

Given that the new strain has been spreading for 2,3 month in the UK, it is obvious that it is already everywhere else in Europe and in the US. And in fact is has been detected everywhere people bothered looking for it. How much are we behind? 5 doublings aka a month? This will become clear when local outbreaks just start exploding. The first local exponential can than be used to extrapolate for the whole country. Given the way exponentials work the numbers won’t be horribly off even if you ignore all the other local seeds of the new strain.

Of course Christmas is going to spoil all the data for at least another week probably two. But within a month we will see whether the whole Covid saga will end with a big bang, where just when the vaccines are starting to be doled out, one last big wave gets most of the population anyway.

Antisemitism is the sodium-glutamate of conspiracy theories

The whole defining feature of conspiracy theories is that there is a cabal somewhere that pulls the strings. A smallish group of people with nefarious intentions. For Alex Jones these are „the globalists“, for David Icke more daringly „the lizard people“. The whole empirical evidence therefore often amounts to a smallish group of people popping up in different contexts, that can be pulled together into a story of purposeful action.

Because of the verbal IQ advantage jews are overrepresented at basically all higher echelons of decision making. Because the reason for the over representation cannot be mentioned in polite society, even the over representation cannot be mentioned in polite society. That makes them the perfect ingredient to conspiracy theories: „Another jew! That cannot possibly be a coincidence!“ Well, because it isn’t.

Both Alex Jones and David Icke run into the conspiracy theorists dilemma: If they do not want to increase the likelihood of getting cancelled considerably, they cannot connect the cabals to the number one choice of evil cabals – the jews. Of course their followers have no such compunction, as a look into youtube comments will make abundantly clear. Antisemitism is the sodium-glutamate of conspiracy theories – every conspiracy theory just works better if you add a little.

Demographic Change in Germany

While the French statistical institute INSEE publishes a very comprehensive list of names given to kids each year, the same data for other countries is hard to come by. In Germany, we have the strange situation that there is no official statistic, because there „is no legal basis“ for the collection of this data, but some guy collects an almost complete list of given names each year as some kind of private project.

Now, this guy doesn’t provide anything like a complete dataset – though he seems to fuel the yearly „most popular baby name“-articles that pop up everywhere. But since 2015 every year not only the 500 most popular baby names in Germany are published, but also the 10 most popular Turkish-Arabic names in Germany and their position on the overall list.

From the position of these names on the overall list, it is not immediately possible to derive an estimate of the percentage of kids with Turkish or Arabic names. Consider:
If the distribution of names is such that neighboring names on the list have almost the same frequency, the first name of a – say – 20% minority will pop up very far down the list, when this gentle slope has reached 0.2 of the frequency of the first name (assuming the same distribution for both majority and minority).
If, however, the distribution drops very quickly, for example as a power law, 1, 0.5, 0.33, 0.25, 0.20, … the first minority name would already appear at position 5 or 6.

In this post I will use the distribution of the French names to estimate the percentage of Turkish or Arabic names in Germany. This is sloppy because the French names do not comprise a single ethnic group any more, so I should probably remove non-French names for a better estimate. But also in that case the distributions of French names, of German names and of Turkish and Arabic names in Germany probably differ quite a bit, so let’s bite the bullet and keep in mind that these estimates are very rough.

Basically, what we will do, is look up the frequency of the names in the French distribution at the positions in the frequency ranking that are occupied by Arab/Turkish names in the German list. The sum of the frequencies will be compared to the sum of the frequencies of the first 10 (German) names. This gives us a straight-forward comparison of the frequency of Arab/Turkish names with the frequency of German names in Germany.

If we assume that both the German names and the Turkish-Arabic names are distributed just like the French names, we get the following estimates for the percentage of boys with Turkish-Arabic names:
2015 – 19.0%
2016 – 20.9%
2017 – 21.7%
2018 – 21.8%
2019 – 23.8%

If I assume the different French distributions of different recent years I get a standard error of around 0.7%, so which French distribution I choose doesn’t seem to impact the result too much.

However, the results for the girls differ significantly.
2015 – 19.3%
2016 – 18.9%
2017 – 19.2%
2018 – 18.6%
2019 – 20.0%

It might be the case that the overlap of Turkish and Arabic names is larger among boys and therefore the female names do not in the same way reflect the large influx of Arabs after 2015. This also opens up the possibility that even the estimates for the boys are underestimates, because Arabic names and Turkish names might be two largely separate distributions.

But given that the last official statistic gave slightly less than 10% muslim babies in 2004 and given that in France the percentage roughly doubled within 15 years, an estimate of 20-25% doesn’t seem absurd.

Update on Covid19

Truth to be told, I have gotten pretty bored with Covid. But things are picking up again, so maybe it makes sense to write down some idle speculation. Interestingly, we have mostly learned so far that we don’t have much of a clue of what’s going on. One of the reasons seems to be, that there isn’t really a binary distinction between „still vulnerable“ and „immune“. Instead there seems to be a spectrum of immunity.

If you just had a full blown infection, you are probably 99.9% immune. Reinfection might happen occasionally, but seems to be quite rare. But if you did not have a full blown infection, you might still have been exposed to the virus in small doses. This exposure already leads to some protection and when the day comes and you get enough viral particles up your nose to start the illness, you will have a milder case than without earlier exposure. If you have never been exposed to Covid19, you might have some protection because of earlier infections with other Corona-viruses. Karl Friston calls these phenomena „immunological dark matter“.

In the current second wave the case fatality rate is significantly lower than in spring. There are several possible reasons: One is the „dry tinder“ effect, which postulates that there is a certain number of old and frail people who are ready to go and are just waiting for the next severe flu. If the flu season has been mild, dry tinder accumulates and when Covid comes along it burns up. Now, we have burned through the tinder and death rates will stay low. In the summer lull this was a popular argument by anti-lockdown activist. They combined it with the claim that we had basically already reached herd immunity.

Unfortunately full herd immunity is unlikely for most places, as even cities like Madrid that have been hit hard in the first wave have strong second waves now. And without herd immunity it seems very unlikely that we have actually burned through more the 20-30% of the dry tinder. More likely reasons for the lower case fatality rate is increased testing, partial immunity by minor exposure and better treatment protocols.

The increased testing part is a bit scary, because it implies that currently we are slowing the growth rate by testing, diagnosing, isolating and tracking. This seems to be a benefit that will run out if the number of cases becomes too high. So at a certain point we might see an acceleration when testing and isolating happens for a much smaller fraction of cases than right now.

Karl Friston predicts that the second wave will kill far fewer people. Given that he is some 30-50 IQ points smarter than the average epidemiologist, he is well worth listening to. Unfortunately this might well hold for his native UK, but it obviously doesn’t hold for Eastern Europe and I doubt it automatically holds for Germany. Incompetence in the spring might be the best protection in the fall.